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Abstract. The paper by Mayo claims to provide a new clarification
and critique of Birnbaum’s argument for showing that sufficiency and
conditionality principles imply the likelihood principle. However, much
of the arguments go back to arguments made thirty to forty years ago.
Also, the main contention in the paper, that Birnbaum’s arguments are
not valid, seems to rest on a misunderstanding.
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The goal of this paper is to provide a new clar-
ification and critique of Birnbaum’s argument for
showing that principles of sufficiency and condition-
ality entail the (strong) likelihood principle (LP).
I must admit I do not find that the paper pro-
vides such a new clarification of the criticism of
Birnbaum’s argument. Rather, much of the criticism
in the paper goes back to arguments made in the
70s and 80s by several authors, for example, Durbin
(1970), Kalbfleisch (1975), Cox (1978) and Evans,
Fraser and Monette (1986). This critique has been
discussed by several statisticians with an opposing
view; see Berger and Wolpert (1988) and Bjørnstad
(1991).
I will concentrate my discussion on what seems to
be the most important contention in the paper, that
the sufficient statistic in Birnbaum’s proof erases the
information as to which experiment the data came
from and, hence, that the weak conditionality prin-
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ciple (WCP) cannot be applied; see, for example,
Sections 5.2 and 7.
As I understand it, this is a misunderstanding of
the proof. For one thing, it seems that only the ob-
servation x2 from the experiment E2 is considered in
the mixture experiment instead of the correct (E2,
x2). The observations in a mixture experiment are
always of the form (Eh, xh)—never as only xh.
Other arguments leading up to this contention
seem to rest on a misunderstanding of the suffi-
ciency considerations in the proof, that given an
observation from a certain experiment the result in
an unperformed experiment is to be reported; see,
for example, Sections 2.4 and 5.1. I find that this
is definitely not the case. To be specific, the author
considers the following proof in the discrete case:
Let (j, xj) indicate that Experiment Ej was per-
formed with data xj, j = 1,2. Assume the data val-
ues x0
1
and x0
2
have proportional likelihoods from
experiments E1 and E2, respectively. Then the suf-
ficient statistic in the mixture experiment used in
Birnbaum’s proof is given by
T (j, xj) = (j, xj) if (j, xj) 6= (1, x
0
1
), (2, x0
2
),
T (1, x0
1
) = T (2, x0
2
) = (1, x0
1
).
Mayo claims that T (1, x0
1
) = T (2, x0
2
) (= c) implies
that the weak conditionality principle (WCP) is vi-
olated. Now, one should note that the proof works
with any c 6= (1, x0
1
) and c 6= (j, xj), j = 1,2 and all
xj . When E2 is performed and x
0
2
is the result, then
1
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the evidence should only depend on E2 and x
0
2
, and
not on a result of an unperformed experiment E1.
This is, of course, correct, but it does not depend
on a result in E1. (Actually E1 is not an unper-
formed experiment either. We comment on this issue
later.) By letting c= (1, x0
1
) it seems so, but we see
by choosing a c 6= (1, x0
1
) it is not the case. So WCP
is not violated. The sufficient statistic simply takes
the same value for these two results of the mixture
experiment. It has nothing to do with WCP.
So Birnbaum’s proof does not require that the ev-
idential support of a known result should depend
on the result of an unperformed experiment. It fol-
lows that the main contention in the paper seems to
rest on a lack of understanding of the basics of the
proof of Birnbaum’s theorem. In fact, it is possible
to do the proof even more generally. One can show,
for a given experiment [see, e.g., Cox and Hinkley
(1974) and Bjørnstad (1996)], that if two likelihoods
are proportional for two possible observations in the
same experiment, there exists a minimal sufficient
statistic with the same value for the two observa-
tions. This holds both for discrete and continuous
models.
To make the sufficiency argument clearer, con-
sider a mixture of a binomial experiment E1 and
a negative binomial experiment E2 where the ob-
servations are x1 = number of successes in 12 trials
and x2 = number of trials until 3 successes. If x
0
1
= 3
and x0
2
x2 = 12 then the likelihoods are proportional.
A natural choice of the sufficient statistic T in the
mixture experiment in Birnbaum’s proof has
T (1, x01) = T (2, x
0
2) = 3/12,
the proportion of successes in either case.
Clearly then, the value of T from experiment E2
does not depend on the result from E1.
As already mentioned, the author claims that the
sufficient statistic T in the proof of Birnbaum’s re-
sult has the effect of erasing the index of the exper-
iment. Moreover, it is claimed that inference based
on T is to be computed over the performed and
unperformed experiments E1 and E2. As we have
shown, this is simply not the case. It should also be
mentioned that statistically the proof simply consid-
ers two instances of performing the mixture exper-
iments resulting in proportional likelihoods and re-
ally has nothing to do with considering unperformed
experiments.
Let me also mention that the author’s premise
in Section 5 is not correct. The starting point is
not that we have an arbitrary outcome of one single
experiment, but rather that two experiments have
been performed about the same parameter resulting
in proportional likelihoods. So Birnbaum does not
enlarge a known single experiment but constructs a
mixture of the two performed experiments. There is
really no unperformed experiment here. In a sense,
one may regard the paper by Mayo as actually not
discussing the LP at all.
It should be clear that I find that the main con-
tention in the paper does not hold when maintain-
ing the original meaning of the principles of suf-
ficiency, conditionality and likelihood. Other com-
ments made in this paper referring to various au-
thors in the 70s and 80s are a different matter. How-
ever, I do not find any new clarification of Birn-
baum’s fundamental theorem in this paper. For ex-
ample, regarding sufficiency, it is necessary to re-
strict the application of sufficiency to nonmixture
experiments, as Kalbfleisch (1975) did, in order to
invalidate Birnbaum’s result. Berger and Wolpert
(1988) argue, I think, convincingly against such a
restriction. See also Bjørnstad (1991).
Let me end this discussion by making clear the
following fact: It is obviously clear that frequen-
tistic measures may, and typically do, violate LP.
This is true as far as it comes to analysis of the
actual data we observe. But a major point here is
that the LP does not say that one should not be
concerned with how the methods do when used re-
peatedly. LP is simply not about method evaluation.
Evaluation of methods is still important. So LP says
in essence that frequentistic considerations are not
sufficient for evaluating the uncertainty and relia-
bility in the statistical analysis of the actual data;
see also Bjørnstad (1996) for a discussion on this
issue.
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